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CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
No questions of any serious consequence concerning general
contract principles were presented to the court for solution dur-
ing the term. The cases under this classification called only for
the application of well recognized rules to fact situations having
no unique angles and thus afford no justification for critical
delineation.
Because time was not shown to have been of the essence,
judgment went in favor of a purchaser of real estate despite his
failure to take title within the time allowed by a written contract
to sell.' And the real estate agent recovered his commission, a
valid acceptance of the offer also having been found.2 In dis-
posing of the defense that the purchaser had not himself com-
plied with the terms of the contract, by pointing out that time
was not of the essence, the court used an approach sounder than
than of the recent case of Lamar v. Young.3
The difference between a contract to sell and a completed
sale figured in a holding that the ten year liberative period for
non-user of a mineral servitude should date from the latter and
not the former. The court found no reason for circumventing
the result by decreeing reformation so as to convert the prelimi-
nary contract into an act translative of title.4 The court's dis-
position of the principal point seems basic.
Despite many previous rebuffs, mineral lessees apparently
keep trying to tie up a lessor's land without running any risk
themselves. It well may be that their object is all too frequently
accomplished, hence their perseverance. There was, apparently,
another such effort contained in a provision that a failure to drill
within ninety days would automatically terminate the lease.
This provision, as the court saw, rendered illusory the obliga-
tion to drill which was the stated consideration. But, since the
ninety day period had expired, it was necessary only to declare
the resulting resolution. Nor did the court find any basis for
a claimed estoppel.5
With comforting practicality the court also found that certain
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Johnson v. Shreveport Properties, 213 La. 485, 35 So. (2d) 25 (1948).
2. Newton B. Stoer v. Shreveport Properties, Inc., 213 La. 503, 35 So. (2d)
31 (1948).
3. Lamar v. Young, 211 La. 837, 30 So. (2d) 853 (1947).
4. Ober v. Williams, 213 La. 568, 35 So. (2d) 219 (1948).
5. Matheson v. Placid Oil Co., 212 La. 807, 33 So. (2d) 527 (1947).
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owners did not waive their right to recover for defects, nor estop
themselves to question the quality of the work, or materials, in
accepting a building on the basis of an understanding that desig-
nated items would be corrected and completed. And since the
contractor and his surety were responsible for not taking the
necessary corrective action, they were charged with the cost of
completion as of the time of the filing of a supplemental petition
some eleven months after the original proceeding was instituted.6
Such a conclusion has the appeal of being not only legally sound
but eminently fair.
The ability of the court to handle realistically the adjust-
ment of such differences was demonstrated in another similar
dispute that involved only questions of evidence concerning
alleged defects in construction of a number of tourist cabins.7
One cannot read the court's opinion in Succession of Molai-
son8 without feeling that the evidence was more than ample to
sustain the annulment of an instrument whereby an adopted
daughter of limited mental capacity and having an inadequate
knowledge of the facts, relinquished, for $5,000.00, her right to
a one-third interest in an estate valued at over a quarter of a mil-
lion dollars. It was apparent that consent had been secured only
through the action of certain interested parties in failing to
apprise her of the true facts-a practice, the code tells us, that
comes under the head of fraud.9
Problems involving transfers alleged to constitute simula-
tions usually raise difficult questions of evidence. It was found
necessary to remand such a case to enable the interested parties
to present additional evidence and file such pleadings as their
interests might require.10
The court disposed of a union's attempt to secure an injunc-
tion to restrain the discharge of certain watchmen by finding
no violation of an applicable collective bargaining contract."
The language employed, in the light of its obvious purpose, gave
adequate support for the court's interpretation.
The litigation between Pennington and Drews12 came before
6. Costanza v. Cannata, 36 So. (2d) 627 (La. 1948).
7. Rinaudo v. Treadwell, 212 La. 510, 32 So. (2d) 907 (1947).
8. Succession of Molaison, 213 La. 378, 34 So. (2d) 897 (1948).
9. Art. 1832, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. Succession of Addison, 212 La. 846, 33 So. (2d) 658 (1947).
11. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Inland
Waterways Corp., 213 La. 670, 35 So. (2d) 425 (1948).
12. Pennington v. Drews, 212 La. 544, 33 So. (2d) 63 (1947). For earlier
opinion see 209 La. 1, 24 So. (2d) 156 (1945), commented on in The Work of
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the court again on the defendant's objection that Louisiana Civil
Code Article 167 limiting personal service contracts to a maxi-
mum term of five years absolved him from the contract. The
court's view was that the mentioned article was not applicable
because the contract was not one of personal service but was in
the nature of a joint enterprise. It further found that the issu-
ance of an injunction restraining conduct contrary to the contract
'would not compel the defendant to render personal services in
violation of the Code provision.
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
Servitudes
The occasion has been taken in previous observations' to
comment upon the manner in which code provisions on servi-
tudes have been getting twisted to cover situations for which
they are not pertinent. While great commendation is due to
the courts for the results they have accomplished in working out
a system of legal standards for the regulation of the oil and gas
industry in Louisiana, great care must be exercised to prevent
the distortion of the basic code provisions in their original con-
text.
In the absence of statutes, the courts have had to make all
the policy determinations, and in working out such decisions of
policy for problems of mineral rights, they are certainly justified
in using whatever basic materials are available for purposes of
analogy and whatever judicial techniques are available for the
accomplishment of the desired results. However, there is no jus-
tification in this process for taking code articles and turning them
inside out so as to read into them, as matters of general interpre-
tation, meanings and rules which are not there and which fur-
thermore are alien and contrary to the fundamental principles of
the articles as they are basically intended to apply to servitudes.
The question of the divisibility of a mineral servitude, as de-
cided in the cases of Ohio Oil Company v. Ferguson2 and Byrd
v. Forgotson,3 has been discussed extensively elsewhere in this
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term (1947) 7 LOUSIANA LAW
REvIEw. 231.
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